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Comments
Two-Tiered Tender Offers and the
Poison Pill: The Propriety of a Potent
Takeover Defense
Contests for corporate control occur frequently in corporate
America.' Complex strategies and ingenious tactics have been developed
both to facilitate takeovers and to defend against them.2 Tender offers3
currently affect millions of shareholders.' The tender offer process
begins when an individual or business entity, commonly referred to
as the bidder, decides to attempt a takeover. The bidder attempts
to gain control of a corporation, the target company, by offering
to purchase a specified number of shares of stock from the
shareholders of the target company at a price above market value.5
1. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Place Inc., 744 F. 2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984).
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
4. See Comment, "Leg-Ups" and "Lock-Ups". An Analysis of Manipulation Under Section
14(e) of the Williams Act. 49 ALBANY L. REv., 478, 478 (1985).
5. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1984 Sacuarris LAw HANDBOOK 324 (1984). The bidder bids for
shares at a premium in the hope that a majority of the outstanding shares will be tendered.
A bidder will usually condition its offer upon the ultimate tender of the number of shares
necessary to gain control. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F. 2d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 1983); see
also I M. LIPToN & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOvERS AND FREEzaouTs, §1.07(5)(b) (1984).
The offer is made to the shareholders, not the corporation. Id. Neither the Williams Act, 15
U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982), nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules
and regulations define "tender offer." Profusek, Federal Decisional Law Under the Williams
Act, 31 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 175, 192 (1982); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1250 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as The Developing Meaning of of Tender Offer]; see Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp.
783 (S.D.N.Y.) (1979), aff'd on other grounds 682 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1069 (1983). The court in Wellman stated that several factors are important in determin-
ing what constitutes a tender offer under the Williams Act:
(I) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an
issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer stock; (3) offer
to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the
offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed
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A tender offer is "hostile" if the directors of the target company
decide to resist the attempt of the bidder to gain control. 6 A techni-
que that is frequently used by takeover bidders is the front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offer.' Resistance by those in control of the target
company may take the form of a variety of "defensive tactics." '
One of the newest and most effective defensive weapons utilized
by the board of directors of a target company to ward off actual
or perceived two-tiered tender offers is poison pill preferred stock. 9
The issuance of the poison pill stock evidences a clash of fundamen-
tal interests within the corporate structure between the unrestricted
right"0 of shareholders to accept a tender offer bid and the ability
of the board of directors to increase the bargaining power of the target
company. " In the recent case of Moran v. Household International
Inc.,' 2 the board of directors of Household adopted a poison pill plan
that may be the most potent defensive tactic yet devised."
maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time;
(7) offeree subject to pressure to sell his stock.
475 F. Supp. at 823-24. These factors were extracted from a list of elements included in an
amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC. Id. at 824.
6. See Comment, supra note 4, at 478-79.
7. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text. The two-tiered bid is a recent phenomenon.
See Comment, The Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offer, 78 N.W. U.S. REv. 811,
812 (1983). Front-end loaded bids offer greater consideration in the first tier of the transaction.
Issues arising from "partial" tender offers and "equal consideration two-step offers" are beyond
the scope of this comment. In a partial offer, the bidder makes a tender offer for less than
all the shares of the target company but does not state any intention to purchase the remaining
shares. In an equal consideration two-step offer, the consideration in the second step merger
is equivalent in amount to the front-end bid price. See Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender
Offers: The Application and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 396-97 (1982).
8. A "defensive tactic" may take two forms. First, the tactic may be responsive and
possible only after an offer is made. Second, a defensive tactic may also be a precautionary
measure taken by a corporation that is fearful of becoming a target. Advanced planning is
sometimes called a "shark repellant." The purpose of a shark repellant, however, is to prevent
an offer from being made, not to defend against the offer. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 11 (1983); R. WINTER, M. STUmIPF AND G.
HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLANTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER
3-7 (1983). See HousE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, EQuiTY IN FOREION AND DOMESTIC
CREDIT AND TENDER OFFER REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 1029 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (com-
prehensive list of defensive strategies).
9. See infra notes 108-124 and accompanying text.
10. In adopting the Williams Act, Congress was concerned that shareholders should have
a fair opportunity to consider tender offers on the merits of the offer. The House and Senate
Reports on the Williams Act demonstrate that Congress intended that the shareholders be the
actual decision makers in the tender offer process. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 3
(1967); H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2 Sess. 4 (1968).
11. Moran v. Household International Inc., Del. Ch., 490 A. 2d 1059, 1074 (1985). The
board of directors of the target company increase their bargaining power by limiting the ability
of a bidder to gain control by fragmentary acquisitions of shares. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 173-185 and accompanying text.
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This comment will first explain the two-tiered tender offer and show
how the bidder attempts a hostile tender offer utilizing the two-tiered
method.' " The effect of two-tiered bids on shareholders and on the
target company will then be examined." Economic arguments will
demonstrate that encouraging an active market for corporate control
is sound public policy.' Following a discussion of defensive tactics
in general, the effects of poison pill preferred stock will be considered.' 7
This comment will then discuss state fiduciary law and the appropriate
standard for reviewing the decision of the directors to issue poison
pill preferred stock.' I Moran v. Household International Inc. will then
be examined, focusing on the poison pill plan adopted by the direc-
tors of Household and the standard of review adopted by the court.' 9
This comment will conclude by proposing that the directors of a target
company must show a compelling business purpose justifying a defen-
sive action that blocks all hostile two-tiered takeovers.2"
TENDER OFRS
A. Background
A tender offer is a publicly made invitation, addressed to all
shareholders of a target company, to tender their shares for sale at
a specified price to the bidder.2' Cash or other securities may be offered
to the shareholders as consideration for their shares. 2 The specified
consideration usually represents a premium over the current market
price of the securities sought. 23 The opportunity to tender shares at
a premium remains open for a limited period of time.24
A tender offer can be used to acquire stock for the purpose of
a takeover attempt of a target company.25 Another purpose for a stock
14. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-124 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 140-172 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 173-209 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 210-229 and accompanying text.
21. The term tender offer is inappropriate. The party making the announcement does not
offer to tender shares; instead, others are invited to tender their shares. The Developing Mean-
ing of Tender Offer, supra note 5, at 1251 n.7 (1973).
22. The term "cash tender offer" refers to tender offers in which the consideration is
cash and an "exchange tender offer" is a tender offer in which the consideration is securities.
Id. at 1251 n.8.
23. One survey reported that the median price offered to shareholders in cash tender offers
was sixteen percent over the market price of the desired shares two days before the offer.
Id. at 1251 n.9.
24. Id. at 1252.
25. Id. at 1253.
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acquisition is to enable a corporation to purchase its own shares for
nontakeover purposes.2 6 The tender offer is an important takeover
weapon that has replaced the proxy contest as a favored means of
overcoming the resistance of an acquisition by incumbent manage-
ment.2
B. The Two-Tiered Tender Offer
A major development in the tender offer process has been the
emergence of the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer.2" The two-
tiered tender offer involves a single attempt to acquire one hundred
percent control of a target corporation in two steps. In the first step
the bidder acquires, usually for cash, enough shares to establish a
controlling interest.29 To guarantee success in the first tier, the bidder
offers to purchase shares at a premium over market price.30 In the
second tier, the bidder acquires the remainder of the shares of the
target company in exchange for cash or securities worth less than the
cash paid in the first tier. 3' Therefore, in a two-tiered tender offer
the bidder will pay more consideration in the first tier than in the
second tier. For example, rather than pay all the shareholders an
average price of fifty dollars, the bidder will buy fifty percent of the
shares at sixty dollars per share to assure the acquisition of a con-
trolling interest. After a controlling interest has been acquired, the
bidder will pay forty dollars for each share in the second tier.32
The two-tiered tender offer is useful to the bidder for two reasons.
First, the two-tiered tender offer increases the chances the bidder will
be successful, because of the pressure on target company shareholders
to tender their shares before the expiration of the first tier offer.33
The strategy of the two-tiered tender offer is to create a stampede
26. See D. AusTIN AND J. FIsHmAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT-THE TENDER OFFER
7 (1970). Another nontakeover situation in which tender offers are often used is when a con-
trolling shareholder seeks to increase the size of the block owned by that shareholder. The
Developing Meaning of Tender Offer, supra note 5, at 1253, n.15.
27. See The Developing Meaning of Tender Offer, supra note 5, at 1253. The tender offer
has been found to be simpler and cheaper than the proxy contest in takeover attempts. Id.
28. See Fleisher, Sun Shines on Bidders in Corporate Takeover World, Legal Times of
Wash., Jan. 25, 1982, at 15, Col. 1 (suggests the major significance of two-tiered tender offers).
The front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer will be referred to as the two-tiered tender offer.
Other types of tender offers are beyond the scope of this comment.
29. Id.
30. Moran, Del. Ch. 490 A. 2d at 1067, n.2.
31. Fleisher, supra note 28, at 15, col. 1.
32. See Greene and Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 677 (1984).
33. Id.
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of tendering shareholders who must tender their shares or run the
risk of losing the high front-end price.34 Second, the two-tiered tender
offer is a less expensive method for gaining one hundred percent con-
trol than a partial tender offer when the bidder decides only after
gaining control to acquire the remainder of the outstanding shares."
After the bidder has obtained control the remaining shares typically
sell for substantially more than the market price prevailing prior to
the tender offer, though less than the amount offered in the tender
offer.3 6 If the bidder later decides to acquire the remaining outstand-
ing shares, the bidder will have to pay a second premium over the
prevailing market price." A bidder making a two-tiered tender offer
sets the price of the second tier and the first tier at the same time."
A two-tiered tender offer will have a lower total cost to the bidder
than a partial tender offer since a partial tender offer involves two
separate transactions, both involving the payment of a premium. 39
Although bidders enjoy the use of two-tiered tender offers, this tactic
has been harshly criticized by commentators." In addition, use of
the two-tiered tender offer has sparked shareholder and target com-
pany litigation. The principal charge against two-tiered tender offers
is that they coerce target shareholders into tendering shares in the
first step, thereby preventing other potential bidders from bidding for
the target."
An element of coercion is inherent in the tender offer process. 2
34. Id.
35. See Comment, Front End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State
Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique. 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 389 (1982).
36. Id. at 389 n.5.
37. Id. One commentator reports that among a group of 26 recent acquisitions of minority
shares by the bidder, all but one were at a premium over market value of at least 10 percent,
and 85 percent were at a premium of at least 35 percent. Chazen, Fairness from a Financial
Point of View in Acquisition of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate
Standard?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1445 n.36 (1981).
38. Comment, supra note 35, at 389 n.5.
39. Id.
40. Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HAv. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974).
(First comprehensive attack on partial and two-tiered tender offers appeared in Brudney &
Chirelstein); see generally Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distribu-
tions and Reorganizations, 71 CAiF. L. REv. 1072 (1983) (unequal sharing of gains between
two groups of shareholders unfairly defeats their expectations); Carney, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Parposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
69 (some two-tiered tender offers inefficient); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028 (1982) (considering the beneficial effects of the two-
tiered tender offers); Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing and "Entire Fairness": Valuation Issues, 38 Bus.
LAW. 485 (1983) (two-tiered bidders risk the dissatisfaction of second step shareholders and
possible suits under Delaware's entire fairness standard).
41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42. Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The court in Radol
held that a two-tiered tender offer, despite its coercive quality, did not constitute a "fraudulent,
Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17
Any tender offer to purchase stock at a premium over the market
price results in pressure on the shareholders of the target company
to tender their shares in the first tier of the takeover attempt. The
coercive nature of two-tiered tender offers has been noted by courts,"3
commentators," and the advisory committee of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 5 Use of the two-tiered tender offer raises the
possibility that heightened pressure on the shareholders will lead them
to tender their shares before evaluating the merits of the sale.4 6
C. Benefits of Hostile Tender Offer to
Shareholders and Corporations
In many instances, corporate takeovers are beneficial exchanges of
corporate control that result in more efficient management of the
resources of the target company.4 7 If incumbent management performs
poorly, share prices will reflect substandard performance by falling
below the highest potential value of the shares on the open market.4"
A profit opportunity then exists for a bidder to purchase the under-
valued shares, replace poor management with competent management,
and reap the benefits.4 9 The bidder will receive benefits through the
increased earnings of the acquired target."0 The shareholders who sold
in the first tier benefit from the high premium they received. Moreover,
a two-tiered tender offer generally gives remaining shareholders an
deceptive or manipulative" act or practice in violation of section 14(e) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1982). Id. at 1312.
43. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md.
1982); Radol v. Thomas 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
44. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 297, 337 (1974) (a comprehensive attack of partial and tv/o-tiered tender offers); Finkel-
stein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Offers: The Validity of Fair Price,
Mandatory Bid, and Flip-over Provisions Under Delaware Law, I 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 291, 291-93
(1984) (an examination of modern defensive tactics to protect target shareholders from partial
and two-tiered tender offers); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Pro-
posal for Legislation, 83 CoLum. L. REv. 249, 307 (1983) (bidders are exploiting the unequal
bargaining position of the target shareholders); Mirvus, Two-Tier Pricing: and "Entire Fairness":
Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485, 489 & n.8 (1983) (two-tiered bidders risk the dissatisfac-
tion of second step shareholders and possible suits under Delaware's entire fairness standard).
But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 727 (1982)
(the premium offered to those shareholders tendering in the first tier compensates for the risk
undertaken and for the facilitation of the transfer of control).
45. Advisory Comm. On Tender Offers, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Report Of Recommenda-
tions 25-26 (1983).
46. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 679.
47. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 380-81 (1980).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 273.
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opportunity to sell their shares in the second tier at prices that are
generally better than those available on the market." The beneficial
result of the two-tiered tender offer occurs because the tender offer
anticipates real gains in productivity.-2
The threat of a hostile takeover has become an important mechanism
for checking the efficiency of management. 3 The market for corporate
control 4 is an effective device for limiting management discretion."
A decrease in corporate profits will be reflected in a decrease in the
price of the stock of the potential target company.16 Typically, a bidder
will make a tender offer when the price of stock of the target com-
pany drops below the value of the stock." A bidder will try to pur-
chase a majority of shares at a price that is less than the actual value
of the shares.5 8 If the bidder can acquire shares for a price less than
the actual value of the shares, then both the shareholders, who sell
at a premium, and the bidder, who acquires desired shares, receive
a benefit from the transaction. s9 The only parties to suffer from the
takeover are the managers who will be removed by the successful bid-
der.60
Empirical research studies have concluded that the stock of target
companies significantly underperforms the market before a tender offer
is made.6' One study concluded that the stock of target companies
51. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 681.
52. Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 273.
53. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981).
54. Id. The market for corporate control involves the purchasing of securities in order
to transfer control of the target company. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The drop in the price of the stock of the target company creates an opportunity
for entrepreneurial profit. Id.
58. Many types of costs may be incurred during a hostile tender offer. See Gilson, supra
note 53, at 841 n.86 (comprehensive list of various transaction costs). One empirical study
has estimated that transaction costs may amount to at least 13 percent of the post-offer market
price of the target's shares. Smiley, Tender Offers, Transaction Costs and the Theory of the
Firm, 22 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 22 (1976).
59. Gilson, supra note 53, at 841-42.
60. Id.
61. Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. FIN.
EcoN. 105 (1980); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns, 5 J. FIN. EcoN.,
351 (1977); Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers and
Stockholder Returns, 33 J. Fns. 505, 509 (1978); Langetecq, An Application of a Three-Factor
Performance Index to Stockholder Gains from Merger, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 365 (1978). One com-
mentator stated:
These results present a fairly consistent pattern. Acquired firms perform poorly before
acquisition and gain significantly upon acquisition. . . . These results . . . show
that acquired firms typically benefit from being acquired because their performance
prior to the merger was below average and was improved by the acquisition. This
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may underperform by as much as fifty percent of the potential value
of the stock.62 Tender offers are also beneficial because the directors
may lack the necessary business opportunities or financial strength
to increase profits.63 Therefore, a target company may be more pro-
fitable if taken over by the bidder." '
In some instances, however, the tender offer process is not beneficial
to the shareholders or the target company. A corporate raider is an in-
vestor who purchases a significant block of the stock of a target com-
pany on the open market. 6 The corporate raider will attempt to sell those
shares back to the corporation at a premium. 66 The attempt to sell the
shares back to the corporation at a premium is called "greenmailing"
the corporation. 67 If the corporate raider cannot negotiate a premium
for the stock, the corporate raider can threaten to mount a proxy fight
either to elect new management or to "bust up" the target company by
selling the assets piecemeal.6' The corporate raider may also threaten to
launch a tender offer to win control and then liquidate the target com-
pany. 69 Therefore, justifying the practice of corporate raiders may be
difficult. 70
The tender offer process is generally an effective mechanism by which
control may be shifted to more efficient managers. The controversial7
two-tiered tender offer is one type of tender offer that is an extremely
strong and attractive acquisition technique used by bidders. The two-
tiered tender offer, though coercive in nature, is beneficial to most parties
to the transaction. Much support for the two-tiered tender offer exists,
however, because acquisition costs for the bidder are reduced. 2 Moreover,
the two-tiered tender offer induces the early tendering of shares." Scholars
confirms that the corporate merger is indeed a device for transferring assets out of
the hands of less competent managers into the hands of more competent ones ....
Asquith, Unpublished Paper, excerpt reprinted in EcoNowcs oF CouoRAarioN LAW AND
SacusrTias REGULATION 229-31 (R. Posner & K. Scott (eds. 1980).
62. See Gilson supra note 53, at 852-53.
63. Id. at 853.
64. Id.
65. Greene and Junewicz supra note 32, at 706.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 297, 337 (1974). Individual stockholders of the target company would have difficulty
refusing the price for the shares in the first tier. The disparity between the two tiers would
deprive the shareholders of the target company of their ability to make an informed decision
as to whether the stockholders should accept the bid. Id.
72. Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19
GA. L. Rav. 281, 320 (1985).
73. Id.
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defend the two-tiered tender offer, arguing that the premium offered
to the shareholders of the target company in the first tier compensates
those who facilitate the transfer of control.7 ' Scholars also defend the
two-tiered tender offer by arguing that every shareholder of the target
company has an equal opportunity to tender shares, and therefore, those
that tender early should be compensated for facilitating the transfer of
control. 71
The overall effect of two-tiered tender offers is beneficial to
shareholders.7 The market price of the stock of the target company gains
an average of thirty percent in the month surrounding a tender offer.77
During a two-tiered tender offer, the blended premium, which represents
the combined premium on an average of both tiers, generally reflects
a significant increase over the pre-bid market price .7 Therefore, real gains
exist for the shareholders of the target company. 9
Target management does not want the company taken over by a bidder
who will remove them from their positions. To retain control of the cor-
poration, target management will often implement a defensive tactic to
thwart the bidders' takeover efforts. Defensive tactics are effective ways
to prevent a bidder from gaining control, but these tactics are not always
beneficial to the target company or to the shareholders of the target
company.
DEFENSIVE TAKEOVER TACTICS
Defensive tactics fall into two categories. The first type is a financial
transaction designed to reduce the attractiveness of a target to a bidder."s
The second type of defensive tactic is a structural defense designed to
make changes in control more difficult to accomplish.'
74. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 44, at 727.
75. Dennis, supra note 72, at 320 n.l85.
76. See infra note 77-79 and accompanying text.
77. See Moran, Del. Ch., 490 A. 2d at 1068 (testimony of Professor Michael C. Jensen.)
To reach his conclusion, Professor Jensen used data contained in a Goldman, Sachs study
of May 29, 1984 and material collected by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Id. at 1068.
78. Id.
79. The SEC recently released a study comparing various types of tender offers. SEC Release
No. 34-21079, 16 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 1119 June 29, (1984). The study disclosed that
the mean blended premium for two-tiered offers equaled 55.1 percent. The mean premium
offered in the first tier equaled 83.5 percent, while the mean premium for the second tier equaled
47.1 percent. In nearly three-fourths of the two-tiered tender offers the difference between the
first and second tier premiums was less than 20 percent. Dennis, supra note 72, at 321.
80. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text. A variance of a financial defensive tactic
involves a special compensation agreement, also known as a "golden parachute," designed
to give target officers and employees a measure of financial security if they lose their positions
as the result of a change in control. Green & Junewicz, supra note 32, at 701, n.266.
81. See infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
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A. Financial Defenses
A variety of corporate takeover financial defenses are available to
the board of directors of a target company. One defensive tactic is
liquidatation of the company in whole or in part.82 This extreme finan-
cial action is known as the "scorched earth" defense. 3 Another option
for target management is to sell an attractive subsidiary or other piece
of corporate property to a friendly bidder who may subsequently make
an offer that the target company will accept.84 The sale by a target
company of such property to a friendly buyer is known as a "crown
jewel" sale. 85 Another type of a financial defense occurs when target
management makes a tender offer for shares of the target company.86
The actions of management make acquisitions of a controlling in-
terest by a bidder more difficult.87 A final example of a financial
defense is when the target makes a tender offer for the bidding cor-
poration.' This tactic is known as the "Pac-Man" defense.09
Financial defenses frustrate a tender offer in several ways. First,
the target company becomes less attractive if substantial indebtedness
has been incurred or an attractive asset has been sold.90 Second, when
target management decides to repurchase the shares of the target com-
pany, the shares begin to trade at a price above the tender offer price,
forcing the bidder to offer more money to remain competitive. 9' Some
financial defenses can involve the accumulation of target company
stock in the hands of owners who will be unwilling to sell to a hostile
bidder.92 This accumulation may render a hostile tender offer impossi-
ble because the bidder cannot gain a controlling interest. 93 These finan-
cial defenses can be effective to halt the advances of a hostile bidder.
Financial defenses, however, may harm the shareholders of the target
company. First, because the tender offer of the bidders has been
thwarted, some of the shareholders of the target company will be
82. See, e.g., Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F. 2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Marshall
Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F.
Supp. 933 (N.D. 11. 1982).
85. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 701.
86. See, e.g., Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F. 2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978); Pogo Producing Co.
v. Northwest Indus., Cir. No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983) (self tender offer).
87. Green and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 701-02.
88. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix, 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
89. Id.
90. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 702.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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unable to sell their shares at a profit."' Second, implementing the
defense may weaken the financial condition of the target company,
resulting in a lower price for shares of the target. 9s The board of
directors of a target company may implement financial defenses without
shareholder approval. 96 Financial defenses are implemented after a
bidder has begun a hostile tender offer.
B. Structural Defenses
Structural defenses are usually undertaken before a tender offer
has been made. 97 These defenses make a change in corporate control
more difficult. As with financial defenses a wide range of structural
defenses are available to target management.
One type of structural defense is classification of the board of direc-
tors into two or more subgroups whose terms of office expire at dif-
ferent times. 98 Another structural defense occurs when the board of
directors recommends to the shareholders that a supermajority provi-
sion be included in the articles of incorporation. 99 The supermajority
provision requires that more than the legal minimum number of
shareholders must approve any merger with or sale of substantially
all of the *assets of the target.' The supermajority provision comes
into effect only when the merger or sale is to an entity owning more
than a certain percentage, usually ten percent, of the stock of the
target company."'
Another structural defense is a "fair price" provision. A fair price
provision is the adoption of an amendment to the certificate of in-
corporation that requires a bidder to pay the same price to all
shareholders of a target company." 2 These provisions deter two-tiered
tender offers because the bidder will have to pay the same price in
-the second tier that was offered in the first tier.0 3
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 702-03.
97. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 703.
98. This action of creating two or more subgroups of directors requires that even a majority
shareholder must wait for at least two successive annual meetings to elect a majority of the
board, assuming three subgroups of equal size. Id. at 703, n.277.
99. Id.
100. Id. The deterrent effect of a supermajority provision is very high when management
controls enough shares to block the "supermajority" vote even if the bidder tenders for all
outstanding shares. Id. at 703, n.278.
101. Id. at 703.
102. Finkelstein, supra note 44, at 295.
103. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 703-04.
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Related to fair price provisions are mandatory bid provisions."4
Mandatory bid provisions generally provide that once a threshold
percentage of outstanding shares of a target company has been pur-
chased by a bidder, the bidder must commence a tender offer for
the remaining stock of the target company."' Mandatory bid provi-
sions may provide that the mandatory tender offer price be at least
equal to the greater of the highest price paid by the bidder in acquir-
ing the initial threshold percentage or the highest market price prior
to the tender offer." 6 The potential expense associated with mandatory
bid provisions encourages potential bidders to negotiate with manage-
ment. 107
The latest structural defensive weapon used by the board of direc-
tors of target companies is poison pill preferred stock." 8 Poison pill
preferred stock is distributed to the common stock shareholders of
the target company as a dividend in the form of convertible preferred
stock.0 9 The preferred holders are entitled to redeem their shares for
cash if the bidder acquires control of the target company." 0 The
redemption price is the highest price paid for the shares of the target
company in the year that the bidder gained control."' In addition,
poison pill preferred stock contains a "flip-over" provision permitting
the preferred shareholders to convert their preferred shares into com-
mon or convertible preferred stock of the successful bidder." 2 Poison
pill preferred stock may be issued by the directors of the target com-
pany if the directors attained shareholder approval to create a class
of preferred stock prior to the takeover bid." 3 Corporations may issue
104. As with fair price amendments, the compulsory redemption provision can discourage
two-tiered tender offers by requiring an offeror to buy a greater number shares at a higher
price. Id. at 704, n.284.
105. Finkelstein, supra note 44, at 298.
106. Id.
107. Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32, at 704.
108. Poison pill preferred stock was introduced by Lenox, Inc. in a fight with Brown-Foreman
Distillers Corp. See Wall St. J., June 16, 1983 at 2, col. 2. Issuance of the poison pill has
since been announced by Bell & Howell Co. See Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1983, at 12, col. 3;
Superior Oil Co., Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 4, col. 2; Warner Communications, Wall
St, J., Jan. 13, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Moran v. Household International Inc., Del. Ch., 490 A.
2d 1059 (1985).
109. Poison pill preferred stock must be distributed on a pro rata basis without even the
slightest degree of discrimination. See Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 5798, slip. op. at 14-15 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
110. Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two Tiered Takeovers: The Poison
Pill Preferred, 97 HAv. L. REv. 1964, 1964-65 (1984).
111. Id. at 1965.
112. See, e.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 5798, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
113. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
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poison pill preferred stock under the authorization of "blank-check"
provisions contained within state corporation statutes.",
4
Poison pill preferred stock issued under "blank-check" provisions
has a high degree of flexibility." ' The characteristics of poison pill
preferred stock, as well as the decision to issue the stock, may be
delayed until the target company perceives a takeover threat." 
6
Blank-check stock originally developed as a device to facilitate the
marketing of securities." 7 Blank-check provisions allow the board of
directors to solicit capital in accordance with prevailing market con-
ditions without delays associated with charter amendments or
shareholder votes."" While preferred stock normally may be issued
with shareholder approval, some states like Delaware" 9 and
California' 0 permit the issuance of blank-check preferred stock by
directors at their discretion. Furthermore, blank-check preferred stock
may contain rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions selected
by the board at the time of issuance.' 2' Accordingly, directors may
determine any and all rights, preferences, or privileges under the blank-
check stock provision.' 22 A danger exists that the board of directors
of a target company will use blank-check power at the expense of
the shareholders of the target company.'23 With the power to issue
blank-check stock, the directors of the target company may ward off
114. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
115. See Finkelstein, supra note 44, at 299 (structural features of poison pill preferred stock).
116. Id.
117. See Note, supra note 110, at 1973 (Poison pill preferred stock may be validly issued
under blank-check provisions).
118. See II W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORAIAONS §5284.1 (rev. ed. 1971).
119. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§102(a)(4), 151(a) (1983).
Every corporation may issue one or more classes or series of stock .. .which
• .may have such voting powers . ..and such designations, preferences . .. or
other special rights ... as shall be stated ...in the resolution or resolutions pro-
viding for the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors pursuant to
authority expressly vested in it by the provisions of its certificate of incorporation.
Id.
120. See CAL. CORP. CODE §202(e)(3).
121. CAL. CORP. CODE §202(e)(3) provides in pertinent part:
If a corporation is authorized to issue more than one class of shares . . . the rights,
preferences, privileges and restrictions granted to or imposed upon the respective classes
or series of shares or the holders thereof, or that of the board, within any limits
and restrictions stated, may determine or alter the rights, preferences, privileges and
restrictions granted to or imposed upon any wholly unissued class of shares or any
wholly unissued series of any class of shares. As to any series the number of shares
of which is authorized to be fixed by the board, the articles may also authorize the
board . . . to increase or decrease .. . the number of shares of any such series
subsequent to the issue of shares of that series.
Id.
122. See CAL. CORP. CODE §202(e)(3), Legislature Committee Comment (1975).
123. Note, supra note 110, at 1974.
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a potential tender offer that would be beneficial to shareholders. 2
By successfully thwarting the advances of a bidder, the board of direc-
tors of the target company will deny the shareholders of the target
company the opportunity to decide who will manage the company.
In an effort to protect shareholders, Congress enacted the Williams
Act.
WILLIAMs ACT
By adopting the Williams Act,' 2" the United States Congress
expressed concern that shareholders should have the opportunity to
consider tender offers on the merits of the offer.'2 Congress found
that takeover bids should be encouraged because tender offers are
helpful devices which provide a check on entrenched and inefficient
management.' 21 Congress did not want to deny shareholders the op-
portunities that result from the competitive bidding for a block of
stock of a given company. 128
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that if hostile
tender offers are blocked by management, shareholders will no longer
be able to sell their shares at a premium.'29 The reallocation of
economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can
improve efficiency and competition, is hindered when target manage-
ment blocks all two-tiered tender offers. 30 The tender offer creates
the incentive for incumbent management to perform well so that stock
prices remain high.' 3 '
124. Id.
125. The Williams Act is part of the broad federal statutory scheme that regulates the securities
market. 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d), 78n(d)(f) (1982).
126. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29, 30, 33 (1977). In Piper, the court
concluded that Congress intended to protect the shareholders, "the pawn[s] in a form of industrial
warfare." Id. at 30. The Williams Act, the Court continued, "is designed solely . . . for the
benefit of investors." Id. at 31 (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967); see also Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) ("There is no question that in imposing [the Williams Act]
Congress intended to protect investors." (citations omitted)); 113 Cong. Rec. 854, 855 (1967)
(stating that the purpose of the Williams Act is to require full and fair disclosure for the
stockholder's benefit); HOUSE Comm. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, EQUITY IN FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC CREDrr AND TENDER OFFER REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (1984); HOUSE CoMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES-CORPORATE EQUITY
OWNERSHI'-DISCLOSURE, H.R. REP. No. 1171, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813 (1968); SENATE CoM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, FULL
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN TAKEOVER BIns, S. Doc. No. 550, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967) (stating that the Act was designed to "require full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror (bidder) and (target)
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.").
127. S. REP. No.. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
128. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633 n.9 (1982).
129. Id. at 643.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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The goal of the Williams Act is to give shareholders the oppor-
tunity to decide whether or not to accept a tender offer without undue
interference from either the bidder or the target company. 32 Thus,
tender offers are conducted through a national "market approach"
in which the goal is to get information to the shareholders of the
target company by allowing both the bidder and target management
to present their arguments.' 33 After arguments on both sides are made,
the shareholders of the target company decide whether to tender their
shares to the bidder.' 34  Congressional committee reports on the
Williams Act underscore the intention of Congress that shareholders,
informed through full disclosure by both sides in the contest, should
be the actual decisionmakers in the tender offer process.' 35
Poison pill preferred stock frustrates the ability of shareholders to
make the choice that Congress viewed as being within the province
of the shareholders.' 36 A poison pill plan may give management an
absolute veto over all hostile tender offers. '3 The effect of the poison
pill is to entrench management.' 38 Thus, the poison pill usurps the
right of the shareholders to control who will manage the company. '39
The decision whether to accept or reject a tender offer should be
left, after full disclosure by target management and bidders, to the
shareholders. When the board of directors implements a poison pill
plan, the question becomes whether target management is acting in
the best interest of the shareholders of the target company.
STATE FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests
of the shareholders.'10 When the directors of the target company im-
132. Takeoyer bids: Hearings on H.R. 14,475 and S. 510 before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce and Finance on the House Comm. On Interstate And Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong.
2d Sess. 4 47-48 (1968) (These hearings emphasized the need "to get information to the in-
vestor . . . and then to let the investor decide for himself.").
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967); H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1968); see Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corporation, 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-31
(1977).
136. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F. 2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978);
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-39 (1982) (opinion of Justices White, Blackman and
Chief Justice Berger). See also National City Lines Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F. 2d 1122, 1129-30
(8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F. 2d 181, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1980).
137. See infra notes 174-185 and accompanying text.
138. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
140. See CAL. CORP. CODE §309 (Cal. Corp. Code §309(a) provides that:
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plement a poison pill plan, the issue arises whether they have ful-
filled their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and shareholders.
The fiduciary duty imposed upon the directors requires that they block
only those takeover bids that would be harmful to the target com-
pany.' Furthermore, the directors should not act in a self serving
manner to preserve their own positions.' 2 Therefore, target directors
who implement a poison pill plan may be charged with seeking to
perpetuate their own control and thus breaching their fiduciary duty. 1
43
This section will examine the standards by which the actions of the
directors of the target company are judged when implementing a defen-
sive tactic.
Courts review the decisions of corporate directors under the business
judgment rule.' 4 4 The business judgment rule is a common law prin-
ciple that proscribes judicial inquiry into the substance of the day-to-
day business decisions of corporate directors.' 4 A simplified view of
the business judgment rule is that no liability will be imposed on direc-
A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a member of
any committee of the board upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in
a manner such director believes to be in the interests of the corporation and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances.
Id.
141. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp. 638 F. 2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v.
Baird, 567 F. 2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977).
142. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A. 2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
143. See National Education Corp. v. Bell-Howell Co., No. 7278, slip. op. at 2 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 25, 1983). The validity of the poison pill plan adopted by Bell & Howell was never deter-
mined. The court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of claims that
the flip-over provision was valid. Id.
144. The business judgment rule has been stated in different ways; however, the rule does
not vary significantly from one jurisdiction to the next. See cases cited at 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COPORATIONS §1039 nn.2-6 (rev. ed. 1975). Fletcher sum-
marizes the business judgment rule as follows:"The law will not hold directors liable for honest
errors, for mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith,
that is, for mistakes which may properly be classified under the heading of honest mistakes."
Id. After analyzing cases considering the business judgment rule, S. Samuel Arsht proposed
the following statement of the rule and limitations:
A corporate transaction that involves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest
of, the directors who authorized the transaction will not be enjoined or set aside
for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards that govern a director's performance
of his or her duties, and directors who authorized the transaction will not be held
personally liable for resultant damage, unless: 1. The directors did not exercise
due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting to authorize the
transaction; or 2. The directors voted to authorize the transaction even though
they did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the transaction
to be for the best interest of the corporation; or 3. In some other way the direc-
tor's authorization of the transaction was not in good faith.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 93, 111 (1979).
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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tors for honest errors or mistakes of judgment when the directors
act without corrupt motive and in good faith. 4 6 Without the protec-
tion of the business judgment rule, few qualified people would be
willing to serve as directors.' 47 Moreover, the courts are generally ill-
equipped to evaluate the relative merits of contrasting business pro-
posals. 4 According to the business judgment rule, the directors' deci-
sions are presumed to be based on sound business judgment.' 9 This
presumption can be rebutted only by a showing of fraud, bad faith
or gross overreaching. 5 ' The business judgment rule allows the direc-
tors to prevail whenever they can articulate a rational, unselfish
business purpose for their actions.' 5 ' Not surprisingly, the decisions
of directors are rarely overturned when subjected to review under this
lenient standard. 152
The business judgment rule does not apply when a conflict of in-
terest exists.' 53 When a conflict of interest exists, the directors bear
the burden of showing the "intrinsic fairness" of their actions.' 4
Normally, proving intrinsic fairness requires a showing of the substan-
tive fairness of the challenged action."' Nonetheless, since courts are
ill-equipped to decide the complex business questions raised by a hostile
tender offer, courts have not applied the intrinsic fairness test.
5 6
When confronted with deciding the merits of the decision of manage-
ment to oppose a hostile tender offer, courts use two standards. When
a majority of the board consists of interested directors, 57 courts apply
the primary purpose test. Under this test, the board bears the burden
of proving that the challenged defensive tactic was motivated by a
valid business purpose and that the valid purpose was the primary
146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
147. Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for Cor-
porate Control, 76 NW. U.L. REv. 980, 983-84 (1982).
148. Id.
149. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F. 2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
150. Id.
151. See e.g. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F. 2d 287, 292 (3rd Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
152. See E. FOLK, THE DELAwARE GENRAL CoRsooAroN LAW 75-81 (1972). But see Arsht,
Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 652,
657 (1979).
153. See, e.g. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F. 2d 733, 73940 (7th Cir. 1979).
154. Lynch v. Cook, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1082, 196 Cal. Rptr. 544, 550 (1983).
155. Id.
156. See Comment, supra note 147, at 983-84.
157. A distinction exists between interested management directors and noninterested indepen-
dent directors. When confronted with a takeover bid, interested directors stand to lose their
management positions and salaries, while independent directors might lose only their directors'
fees and whatever prestige accompanies the position. Id.
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motivation for the defensive maneuver taken by the board."' The
primary purpose test is necessary because of the inherent conflict of
interest that exists.159
If, however, the board of directors of the target company includes
a majority of "independent" nonmanagement directors, most courts
hold that no conflict of interest exists and thus apply the more lenient
business judgment rule.'" The business judgment rule is applied
because independent directors are less likely than inside management
directors to implement a defensive strategy based on self-interest.1 6'
Since boards of directors include a majority of independent directors
the primary purpose test can be viewed as being a limited exception
to the business judgment rule. 62
A. The California Approach
As in other jurisdictions, a director of a California corporation owes
a fiduciary duty to the corporation. 63 California has adopted the view
that a director will not be held liable for an honest mistake of business
judgment."' California law permits the directors to take action without
shareholder approval in certain situations. For example, statutes per-
mit directors to amend the bylaws"' or issue "blank-check" stock.' 66
The statutes are silent, however, about the role of the target com-
pany directors in the tender offer context.
In California, as in other jurisdictions, directors may be ousted from
their positions in the event of a successful hostile tender offer.
Although corporations elect directors annually at the shareholders
meeting, 67 a successful bidder does not have to wait for a shareholders
meeting to install new directors. The successful bidder may remove
158. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F. 2d 357, 382 n.47 (2nd Cir. 1980).
159. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HAav. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1981).
160. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F. 2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos., 638 F. 2d at 383; Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.,
555 F. Supp. 892, 904 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 717 F. 2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
550 (1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D. Md. 1982);
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. II1. 1982); but see Klaus v. HiShear
Corp., 528 F. 2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975).
161. Note, supra note 110, at 1970.
162. Id.
163. CAr. CoRP. CODE §309.
164. Id. §309, Legislature Committee Comment.
165. Id. §1101.
166. Id. §202(e)(3).
167. Id. §301(a).
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the incumbent directors without cause, 68 and select replacements'69
either by written consent 70 or at a special shareholders' meeting called
at the successful bidder's request.' 71
Case law has helped define the proper role of management. In
California, the court has yet to face the issue of the propriety of
the poison pill preferred defensive tactic. Recently in Delaware,
however, the poison pill cleared a major legal hurdle and now other
corporations are likely to implement poison pill plans. California and
other jurisdictions should not follow the Delaware approach because
the decision creates the potential for abuse of directorial authority.' 72
B. Moran v. Household International Inc.
In January of 1985 a Delaware court recognized the use of poison
pill preferred stock in Moran v. Household International Inc.171 Moran
represents the first legal test of the poison pill preferred tactic. The
Chancery court held that adoption of the poison pill plan by the board
of directors of Household, without shareholder approval, was in the
interests of the shareholders, and thus was a reasonable exercise of
business judgment.
The poison pill plan adopted by Household was an unusually potent
poison pill defense.'7 4 The complexity of the poison pill plan was
designed to create uncertainty concerning the implications and effects
of the plan on the part of a potential bidder. 7 ' The poison pill plan
involved the issuance of stock rights to the common stockholders of
Household to purchase one hundred dollars worth of Household
preferred stock.'76 The stock rights issued by Household were, when
168. Id. §303.
169. Id. §305(a).
170. Id. §305(b).
171. Id. §305(c).
172. Moran, 490 A. 2d, at 1083. Moran v. Household International Inc. was recently decided
by the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Delaware Court of Chancery and upheld the Rights Plan as a legitimate exercise of business
judgment by Household. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of Household
adopted the Rights Plan in the good faith belief that it was necessary to protect Household
from coercive acquisition techniques. The Delaware Supreme Court did note, however, that
while the directors of Household were protected by the business judgment rule, the ultimate
response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the actions of the directors at that time,
and nothing relieves the directors of their basic fundamental duties to the corporation and
its stockholders. Moran v. Household International Inc. No. 37, slip. op (Del. Supr. Nov.
19, 1985).
173. 490 A. 2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
174. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 6, Moran v.
Household International Inc., Del. Supr. No. 37, 1985.
175. Moran, 490 A. 2d at 1066.
176. Id.
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issued, not separable from the common stock.'77 In addition, the stock
rights were not exercisable, thereby preventing the holders from exer-
cising their rights to purchase Household preferred stock.'78 The poison
pill plan introduced by Household provided, however, that the stock
rights would detach from the common stock and become exercisable
if anyone made a tender offer for at least thirty percent of Household's
stock, obtained twenty percent of Household's stock, acquired the
right to purchase or to vote twenty percent of the stock, or formed
a group holding twenty percent for the purpose of acting together.11 9
The stock rights issued by Household would be of consequence in
one event. If a hostile tender offer for Household was successful,
the rights would flip over so that the holders could purchase, for
one hundred dollars per right, two hundred dollars worth of the stock
of the bidding company.' In effect, the acquiring company would
have to pay a net of 100 dollars worth of stock for each right held
by a Household shareholder.''
The flip-over would only occur if the acquisition was the result
of a hostile tender offer. Since the stock rights could be redeemed
by the Household board for a relatively nominal amount of fifty cents
each at any time before one of the twenty percent triggering events
occurred, the board could remove the "poisonous" effect of the plan
for any takeover of which the board approved.'82 Thus, the plan forced
any bidder to seek and obtain approval from the board of the target
company. The redemption privilege attached to the stock rights issued
by Household discouraged hostile two-tiered tender offers because the
stock rights permitted the shareholders to deplete the assets of the
bidding entity. 8 3 If a bidder was unable to acquire a large percen-
tage of a target company after the poison pill was issued, the dilu-
tion of the capital of the bidding entity would be immediate and
devastating. 8 The board of directors of Household issued poison pill
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Household had approximately 60 million shares of common stock outstanding, which
were trading at a price around 30 dollars per share. Household issued 60 million rights, one
per share of common, each costing the acquirer a net of 100 dollars in payment to the right
holder following a "flip-over." If all the rights issued by Household flipped over and were
exercised, the bidder would be required to pay an extra $6 billion for the company, which
at the time the plan was adopted had a market value of approximately $1.8 billion. Amicus
Brief for the SEC, supra note 174, at 7-8.
182. Moran, 490 A. 2d at 1066.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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preferred stock rights claiming that the issuance was necessary to pro-
tect the shareholders and the company from all coercive two-tiered
tender offers.' 85
At the time the poison pill plan was adopted by the board of direc-
tors of Household, the board explicitly invoked the business judg-
ment rule as authority for the action.8 6 The board sought applica-
tion of the same standard in the Delaware Court.'87 Plaintiff
shareholders argued that the business judgment rule was not the proper
standard since the poison pill plan would prevent the shareholders
of Household from receiving tender offers.'88 The plaintiffs argued
that the directors of Household had the burden of proving that the
plan was fair and reasonable to the shareholders.' 8 9
The Moran court applied the business judgment rule to review the
issuance of the poison pill preferred stock.' 90 The court noted that
since a majority of the directors of Household were independent, the
presumption of good faith was heightened. 9 ' The Moran court also
noted that the directors of Household implemented the plan as a
response to general vulnerability.' 92 Thus, the tactic was pre-planned
rather than reactive.' 93 The court emphasized that prospective con-
tingency plans reduce the risk of ill-planned reactive devices which harm
shareholder interests. Since the defense was pre-planned, the poison
pill device was given the protection of the business judgment rule. 9
The poison pill plan permitted the Household board to act as prime
negotiator in the event of a hostile two-tiered tender offer.' 95 The
poison pill plan adopted by Household created a structural change
in the relationship between the shareholders and the board of
Household by giving the directors the ability to decide whether to
accept a tender offer.' 96 The court held that this structural change
required the Household board to present evidence, notwithstanding
the business judgment rule, to show that the poison pill plan was
not motivated primarily by a desire to retain control.' 97
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1074.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1074-75.
192. Id. at 1075.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1076.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Although the court found that the poison pill plan would virtually
eliminate hostile two-tiered tender offers, they held that Household
was not required to show the intrinsic fairness of the plan.' 8 Rather,
the directors had to meet the standard of the business judgment rule
and show that the poison pill plan was reasonable at the time of adop-
tion.'99 The Moran court held that the directors had the burden of
going forward with evidence to show the reasonableness of their
actions. 20 The directors, however, did not bear the burden of per-
suasion. 20 1 The directors did not have to prove that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to relief.20 2 Since directors are protected under the business
judgment rule, the burden of persuasion remains with the party
challenging the actions of the directors. 203 To withstand legal scrutiny
under the Moran test, the decision of the directors to issue the poison
pill need not be particularly compelling or persuasive. 20 4 The stan-
dard articulated in Moran does not protect the interest of the
shareholders. 2 5 In practice, the directors need only give a plausible
reason to justify their actions.20 6
The legal test adopted in Moran raises serious questions concern-
ing the adequacy of protection given to target company shareholders.2 7
Moreover, the Moran court noted that the poison pill plan adopted
by the directors of Household was subject to potential abuse of direc-
torial authority because the directors of Household had the ability
to inflict harm upon the corporation by rendering Household takeover-
proof. 208
The Moran decision sets forth burden of proof rules that are vir-
tually insurmountable for a shareholder attacking the decisions of cor-
porate directors. A poison pill plan like the one adopted in Moran
deserves greater scrutiny than the standard applied in Moran. The
poison pill plan adopted in Moran would allow the directors to exer-
cise arbitary power by using the poison pill to deter takeovers that
might be in the best interests of all the shareholders.20 9
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Greene and Junewicz, supra note 32 at 717.
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PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW
The California Supreme Court has held that a director is a fiduciary
who holds powers of trust.2"' As a fiduciary, the director cannot serve
personal interests first and shareholder interests second.2"' The direc-
tor cannot use directorial power for personal advantage or to cause
detriment of stockholders." 2
In Klaus v. Hi-Shear, Inc.,213 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit suggested a promising approach for dealing with
the burden of proof issue. In Klaus, the directors of Hi-Shear
authorized the issuance of shares for the acquisition of two subsidiaries
and for formation of an employee stock option plan." ' The issuance
of the shares deterred Klaus' attempt to gain control of Hi-Shear.21 5
The district court held that issuance of the stock option shares con-
stituted wrongful use by the Hi-Shear directors of their corporate posi-
tion.2"6 In addition, the district court found that the directors acted
to further their personal interests and were motivated primarily by
an interest in maintaining control.2"7 The burden of proof then shifted
to the directors of Hi-Shear.21 8 The appellate court required the defen-
dants to show a "compelling business purpose" behind the defensive
tactic.2"9 The court characterized the compelling business purpose test
as a fairness test intended to balance the positive effects to the cor-
poration against the disproportionate advantage to majority
shareholders and incumbent management.22 The compelling business
purpose test will protect shareholders from directors of a target com-
pany who implement a poison pill plan that blocks all two-tiered tender
offers. The compelling business purpose test will prevent the direc-
tors of the target company from enacting a poison pill plan in order
to entrench their management positions.
The compelling business purpose test has not yet been applied in
any case in which control was found to be merely a contributing
motivation. 22' No justification exists for corporate directors to issue
210. Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App.3d 119, 126, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (1985).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Klaus v. Hi-Shear, Inc., 528 F. 2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
214. Id. at 228.
215. Id. at 234.
216. Id. at 230.
217. Id. at 234.
218. Id. at 233-34.
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221. See Comment, supra note 147, at 1010 n.145.
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a poison pill that will block virtually all two-tiered tender offers. 22
Therefore, the directors should be required to justify a Moran type
poison pill plan with a compelling business purpose. The Klaus test223
will assure protection of the interests of shareholders from the in-
herent conflict of interest that arises when management adopts a defen-
sive tactic that virtually eliminates all two-tier tender offers.
The board of directors of a target company cannot be presumed
to act in the shareholders interests.2 4 When a threat to control is
involved, the directors of the target company are confronted with a
conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult.2  Hence,
the burden should be placed upon the directors of the target com-
pany to justify a poison pill plan as one primarily in the corporate
interests. 226
The interposition of management as the sole authority for deter-
mining whether a tender offer should go forward is not a substitute
for a vigorous market approach in which the shareholders decide. 2"
The consistent view of Congress has been that the decision whether
to accept or reject a tender offer should be left, after full disclosure
by management and bidders, to shareholders. 228 The poison pill plan
would undercut the process contemplated by the Williams Act by giving
the target board a plenary negotiation role on behalf of the
shareholders. 2 19 Such a scheme, renders the poison pill plan inherent-
ly contrary to the interests of the shareholders and a similar plan
should not be upheld in California. Klaus, being a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, is persuasive authority for California to extend the compelling
business purpose test to a tender offer situation like Moran.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that hostile two-tiered tender offers are
not destructive to the corporation and most shareholders. A poison
pill plan similiar to the plan adopted in Moran goes far beyond the
notion of legitimately protecting the interest of the corporation and
shareholders. By resisting all two-tiered tender offers, management
222. Amicus Brief for the SEC, supra note 174 at 20.
223. See Klaus, 528 F.2d at 234 (9th cir. 1975).
224. Bennett v. Propp., Del. Supr., 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962).
225. .Cheff v. Mathes, Del. Supr., 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
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227. Amicus Brief for the SEC, supra note 174 at 29.
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may deprive shareholders of the maximum profits from their in-
vestments. If the directors' resistance is not well founded, the direc-
tors should be liable to the shareholders for depriving them of the
opportunity to tender their stock. This comment has suggested that
a defensive tactic designed to block all two-tiered tender offers should
be judged under a compelling business purpose test. The business judg-
ment rule was never intended to allow directors to circumvent or ignore
the best interests of the shareholders. The interests of the shareholders
can only be protected by increasing the level of judicial inquiry into
the performance of the directors duties. Application of the compell-
ing business purpose test is necessary to protect the interests of the
shareholders.
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